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FORUM SHOPPING AND OTHER
REFLECTIONS ON LITIGATION
INVOLVING U.S. AND EUROPEAN
BUSINESSESt
Donald C. Dowling, Jr.tt
I. INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
When U.S. lawyers say they practice "international law,"
they usually mean "international transactional law." These
lawyers help set up international deals. But just as domestic
business deals give rise to disputes that wind up in litigation,
international business deals which go sour often find their way
into tribunals such as courts and the arbitration process. A key
part of international law practice is resolving international
disputes.
U.S. lawyers, more so than their European counterparts,
draw a sharp distinction between transactional and litigation
practice. However, an understanding of international business
dispute resolution is essential for structuring successful inter-
national deals. You cannot set up a deal properly if you do not
plan for what will happen if the deal goes bad.
©1994 by Donald C. Dowling, Jr.
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In fact, dispute issues are sometimes central elements to an
international deal. I recently worked with a U.S.-based com-
pany which had developed a cutting-edge technology unavaila-
ble outside the U.S. The client, which did not have a European
presence, negotiated with an Italian counterpart which enjoyed
a major European market share. The Italian counterpart
wanted to license the innovative U.S. technology and distribute
the resulting products throughout Europe. The relationship
had the makings of a classic "win-win" scenario: each party had
something the other wanted. The sticking point was enforce-
ment, how to avoid disputes over compliance. The U.S. com-
pany had difficulty proposing a workable royalty licensing
arrangement, because all the sales information would be in the
hands of the Italian company, an arms-length competitor on the
other side of the Atlantic. The Americans were reluctant to dis-
close valuable trade secrets to a foreign competitor which would
be in a position to exploit the information for its own gain.
While the deal initially appeared simple, it ended up being vir-
tually unworkable because the specter of disputes loomed too
large. The deal's weakness was the unavailability of a viable
dispute resolution mechanism.
This illustrates why transactional lawyers representing
U.S. companies with international business interests need to be
able to spot and address international dispute resolution issues.
This paper will examine those issues, raising them in their
broadest possible context and illustrating them with examples
from and reflections on my own experience. This is a practice-
oriented discussion which has as its goal the examination of the
link between dispute resolution procedures and U.S. businesses'
transactions with Europe.'
1 This paper offers a "hypothesis-forming," as opposed to "hypothesis-test-
ing," treatment of international litigation issues. See WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH, THE
PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS 4-5 (1964); see generally Donald C. Dowling, Jr., General
Propositions and Concrete Cases: The Search for a Standard in the Conflict Be-
tween Individual Property Rights and the Social Interest, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAw 353, 357 n. 30 (1985). Only a book-length treatment could
possibly flesh out the legal principles behind all the international litigation issues
discussed here. Currently, the two leading treatises attempting to do this by ad-
dressing the law of international litigation in U.S. courts are GARY B. BORN &
DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS, COMMEN-
TARY AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1992) and DAVID EPSTEIN & JEFFREY L. SNYDER, IN-
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II. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS: FORUM SELECTION, ARBITRATION
CLAUSES, AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND
EUROPEAN COURT PROCEDURES
When businesses in two different countries have a dispute
which leads to litigation, the first and probably most important
issue is forum selection, or "forum shopping."2 Because interna-
tional business disputes often center on contracts, the primary
issue governing international forum selection is the text of the
parties' contract. The secondary issue is the geographic location
of the party which files the litigation, and the location of its law
firm.
A. Contractual Forum Selection Provisions
Working a forum selection clause into an international con-
tract is perhaps the most important example of how interna-
tional litigation issues fit into international transactional
practice. The transaction lawyer who negotiated an original
contract and its forum selection clause often has a greater im-
pact on the outcome of an after-arising dispute than does the
litigation attorney who ends up handling the case. 3
The drafter of a forum selection clause must distinguish
choice of law from choice of forum location, and must distin-
guish both of these from choice of forum type. Choice of law is
simply the choice of which legal system will govern the contract.
Usually this is the legal system of one of the parties's home
countries, 4 but the parties can also designate a third countries'
TERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY
(1993).
2 "Forum selection" and "forum shopping" address the same thing; the differ-
ence is who is speaking. The party choosing the forum is engaged in "forum selec-
tion," while the party dragged into a forum against its will accuses its adversary of
"forum shopping."
3 See, e.g., Interamerican Trade Corp. v. Companhia Fabricadora de Pecas,
973 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1992) (enforcing contractual selection of Brazilian forum);
Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992) (en-
forcing contractual selection of British forum), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992).
See generally Michael F. Solimine, Forum Selection Clauses and the Privatization
of Procedure," 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51 (1992). See also generally discussion infra
at part V.
4 On occasion, resolving international disputes pursuant to an arbitration
clause can involve applying the law of more than one legal system. Cf Comment,
The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in International Commercial Arbitration:
A Case. for Contractual Depe~age, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 163 (1991).
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legal system, or even a private legal structure which is not tied
to any one government.5
Surprisingly, contract drafters often inadvertently truncate
the choice of forum location and choice of law issues designating
one without mentioning the other. Analytically, choice of forum
location is an issue entirely separate from choice of law. Often
as a means of compromise, parties which distinguish these is-
sues will stipulate that one party's national law applies to a
contract, while the other party's national courts will serve as
the site for litigation arising out of the deal.6
The third issue related to choice of law and choice of forum
location is choice of forum type. At its most basic, this is the
question of "to arbitrate or to litigate?"7 Deciding between arbi-
tration and litigation depends on many factors: a party's assess-
ment at the transaction stage8 of who is most likely to initiate
proceedings in the event of a dispute; how trustworthy are the
courts in the respective parties' jurisdictions; and how enforcea-
ble a court award would be against the other side.
5 For example, parties from countries not signatory to the U.N. Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods might nevertheless incorporate
the Convention as a term in their contracts. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, 19 I.L.M. 668,
671 (1980) (available in foreign law volume of Martindale-Hubbell). This Conven-
tion is a treaty which has 34 signatory countries (including the U.S. and European
Union member states Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Spain), but parties in non-signatory states can invoke the Convention by incorpo-
ration as a term in a contract.
6 Courts around the world generally respect contracting parties' right to stip-
ulate that the law of a non-forum country will apply to a dispute within the forum.
See, e.g., citations supra at note 5. Usually courts require only that the country
chosen for its governing law have some rational connection to the deal. Thus, if a
U.S. company and a Spanish company enter a joint venture to be performed in
Germany, the parties' contract could safely designate the laws of the U.S., Spain,
or Germany. If, however, the parties decided to invoke Nigerian law, their selec-
tion likely would not stand up if challenged later in a court with a more logical
connection to the deal.
7 Actually this is an oversimplification, because alternative dispute resolu-
tion clauses often contain other options, including forms of mediation. Usually,
however, the final dispute resolution step will be arbitration. Cf Steven C. Nelson,
Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INTL LAw. 187 (1989) (arti-
cle discussing international dispute resolution "alternatives" devotes 11 pages
[193-203] to arbitration and less than 3 pages [204-06] to all other 'alternatives").
8 Theoretically, after a dispute arises the parties can jointly opt for arbitra-
tion, even if no arbitration clause had been worked into the contract at the transac-
tion stage. In practice, however, this almost never happens.
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Common justifications for arbitration such as speed and
cost-savings are largely illusory in today's environment. The re-
ality of scheduling international arbitrations, especially those
with panels of three arbitrators, can lead to delays similar to
those inherent in court proceedings. Also, complex business ar-
bitrations involving U.S. parties can be as expensive as court
proceedings. I was recently involved in an international busi-
ness arbitration in which the hearing ended up lasting more
than a month, and in which the pre-hearing discovery proceed-
ings had been more elaborate than those in most international-
context court lawsuits. One of my partners spent two weeks fly-
ing all over the Far East taking depositions in a trip that ended
up covering more ground than Marco Polo's.
Yet international arbitration has two important advan-
tages which keep it at the forefront of dispute resolution options
in international deals. First is neutrality. Arbitration is a nat-
ural middle ground: A foreign adversary's local courts usually
appear biased, and your country's courts usually appear just as
biased to your adversary. International arbitration associations
especially those not based in either party's country, generally do
not play favorites. Parties to a deal can also select both a site
and a language for an arbitration proceeding which favors
neither side.
Perhaps most important, arbitrations are, believe it or not,
more readily enforceable abroad than court awards. 9 As a prac-
tical matter, a U.S. party which gets a judgment in a U.S. court
against a European defendant which does not have sufficient
assets in the U.S. will end up re-litigating in a European court,
in order to get the Europeans to enforce the judgment against
the defendants' European assets. Enforcing an arbitration
9 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.IA.S. No. 6999, 330 U.N.T.S.
38, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (available in foreign law volume of Martindale Hubbell) (the 83
signatory countries include the U.S. and all European Union [EU] states except
Portugal); David Rivkin, 'International Arbitration," chapter 9 in COMMERCIAL AR-
BITRATION FOR THE 1990's 123, 124 (1991) ("international arbitration awards are
easier to enforce than foreign court judgments"); cf Ramona Martinez, "Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards Under the U.N. Convention
of 1958: The 'Refusal' Provisions," 24 INT'L LAw. 487 (1990).
1995] 469
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award within a New York Convention country, on the other
hand, is much simpler.10
B. Location of Party Bringing Dispute to the Forum, and of
its Law Firm
If no underlying contract unequivocally designates the fo-
rum before which the international dispute must be brought,
the most important factor governing choice of forum becomes
the geographic location of the party filing the action and the lo-
cation of its law firm. This issue can start a "race to the court-
house" in those disputes where each party can articulate some
claim against the other.
When the claimant bringing the dispute is based in the
U.S. and has U.S. counsel, that party almost always favors U.S.
courts. The chief reason is the fabled "home court advantage.""
Although statistics are hard to come by, experience, both per-
sonal and by reading enough reported case decisions, shows
that judges in every country do indeed tend to favor local par-
ties over foreigners. "Home court advantage" is a legitimate
factor to consider when selecting a forum.
However, this factor should not overwhelm the other issues
in play, especially when a U.S.-based company has a substan-
tial presence in the adversary's forum, and is to that extent ef-
fectively local. There is a huge Toyota plant in the small
Kentucky town of Georgetown. Procter & Gamble has extensive
operations near Brussels, Belgium. Neither Toyota of Japan
nor U.S. Procter & Gamble would have to worry about getting
"home-towned" in, respectively, Kentucky or Belgian courts.
Additionally, a neutral court forum is available whenever par-
ties from two countries are doing business in a third country.
A key choice of law factor is the applicable legal systems'
substantive laws governing the actual dispute. Too often U.S.
parties and their lawyers reflexively decide that U.S. law is in-
10 In fact, New York Convention arbitrations circumvent most of the problems
discussed in the rest of this paper.
11 Another important reason U.S. claimants favor U.S. courts is the higher
amount of damages frequently available. However, this is not as significant a fac-
tor in breach of contract litigation (as are so many business disputes), because U.S.
courts more strictly limit breach of contract damages than damages under other
legal theories.
470 [Vol. 7:465
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herently better for U.S. clients. But conceptually, every time
U.S. law differs from a foreign doctrine, there is a 50% chance
that the foreign rule will be better for the U.S. client. 12 An in-
formed choice of law decision is therefore impossible before re-
searching both legal systems' applicable rules. A knee-jerk
preference for U.S. law can be a real disservice to clients.' 3
Additionally, having the "home court advantage" and even
winning a judgment are meaningless, if the judgment will not
be enforceable against the defendant's assets. Too often, U.S.
parties and their lawyers maneuver for a U.S. court forum, even
when a U.S. judgment will ultimately prove worthless. I know
a U.S. born and trained lawyer acting as a legal consultant in
Salzburg, Austria, who limits his consulting practice to helping
enforce U.S. judgments throughout Europe. This consultant la-
ments that he has seen too many cases where U.S. clients' law-
yers have treated cases in U.S. courts against solvent European
defendants just like domestic cases. They focused on proving
liability and damages, but effectively ignored the international
litigation issues of transnational service of process, personal ju-
risdiction, and enforcement of judgments abroad, until it was
too late. U.S. parties and their lawyers too often expend sub-
stantial time and resources, - and sometimes even win multi-
million dollar verdicts - but end up recovering nothing,
because the defendant's foreign assets prove unreachable. The
12 Legal rules almost always exist in isolation from party nationality.
Is U.S. businesses' (and lawyers') knee-jerk preference for a U.S. forum can
lead to illogical results. I once saw a draft of a form employment contract between
a U.S. based company with a U.K. office and its U.K. citizen employees working in
the U.K The draft, which contained non-compete provisions, called for U.S. law
and courts to adjudicate all disputes. But U.K. employment law (like that of most
countries, including the U.S.) cannot be opted out of; this contract was therefore
unenforceable, because key terms of the parties' relationship, such as minimum
wage, workplace safety, collective bargaining, sick leave, maternity pay, and sever-
ance pay, were necessarily governed by U.K. law. Further, designating a U.S. fo-
rum often makes little sense when the other party has no ties to, assets in, nor
reason to travel to the U.S. The employer in this scenario might have rather easily
convinced a U.S. court to award a default judgment after a litigated dispute arose,
such as for breach of the non-competition clause, and after the employee failed to
show up in the stateside court. But getting a U.I court to enforce the default
judgment would be another matter entirely. And a non-competition or non-solici-
tation injunction from a U.S. court would be toothless if an ex-employee were com-
peting overseas. Also, if a U.K. ex-employee sued simultaneously on an
employment theory in a U.K. tribunal, the British forum would almost certainly
retain jurisdiction, notwithstanding the choice-of-U.S.-forum clause.
1995] 471
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lesson is that while having the "home court advantage" can in-
deed be important, a lawyer should not let that advantage lure
the client away from its real, ultimate goal: collecting a
judgment.
C. Discovery Is a Critical Difference Between U.S. and
Foreign Procedure
A vast gulf separates U.S. pretrial procedures from those of
the rest of the world. Ironically, while U.S. business people
often complain about the expense of domestic U.S. litigation,
once an international dispute actually arises, these same Amer-
ican executives often feel more comfortable in U.S. courts pre-
cisely because they offer more elaborate pre-trial discovery
procedures. 14 Yet the very availability of broad U.S. discovery
gives rise to European businesses' healthy aversion to U.S.
courts.
When facing a forum selection decision, particularly one in
which you feel tempted to undo a European claimant's choice of
a European forum, try the exercise of looking at the litigation
process from the European viewpoint. According to one French
lawyer who is also admitted to practice in the U.S.:
U.S.-style procedural rules, the absence of which U.S. liti-
gants tend to criticize in European courts, are precisely those con-
sidered to be the most outrageous by European litigants in U.S.
courts.
Europeans are wary of U.S. jury trials because of the wide
discrepancies in awards between [European] Community and
U.S. jurisdictions. In civil law countries, juries do not participate
in civil or commercial matters. 15
'4 A vivid example of this thinking (albeit from a U.S. Judge, not an executive)
is the surprising 1993 ruling from highly-respected U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals judge Richard Posner in Allendale Mut. Ins. v. Bull Data Systems, 10 F.3d
425,430 (7th Cir. 1993), laterproc. 32 F.3d 1175 (1994). This opinion allows litiga-
tion over a French warehouse fire to proceed in a U.S. court, notwithstanding the
intrinsically French nature of the dispute, because "[it does not] appear that the
Commercial Court of Lille [France] is equipped to resolve a massive document
case."
15 Patrick Thieffry, 'European Integration in Transnational Litigation,' 13
B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L. Rsv. 339, 356-57 (1990). The point here is that a U.S. de-
fendant to European court litigation should think hard before urging to a Euro-
pean tribunal that U.S. courts are more appropriate. This is particularly true
[Vol. 7:465
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III. INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS, FROM
SERVICE OF PROCESS THROUGH ENFORCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT
Notwithstanding all the foregoing, quite often U.S. parties
to international deals end up litigating international disputes
in U.S. courts. While many aspects of these cases are identical
to domestic business litigation, certain key procedural issues
take on special importance in the international context, particu-
larly service of process, personal jurisdiction, discovery, and en-
forcement of foreign judgments.
A. Service of Process
Domestically, service of process is usually a relatively sim-
ple issue which paralegals and court personnel handle without
the need for much attention from lawyers. However, in interna-
tional-context litigation, service of process is far more complex,
because service on a foreign defendant involves sovereignty and
international diplomacy. By effecting service abroad, the forum
country performs an act with legal effect inside the recipient
country's national borders. Service of U.S. process on European
parties requires special attention.
I recently worked on a case in which our client was an Eng-
lish defendant sued in a Tennessee federal court. A solid argu-
ment existed that the service of process was technically
improper, so we challenged it. But our Tennessee local counsel
asked us several times why we were expending so much legal
time, effort, and expense on a service of process issue likely to
be resolved against us. Indeed, because domestic service of pro-
cess deficiencies are usually curable, domestic service technical-
ities often are not worth expensive collateral litigation.
However, the analysis is quite different in the foreign context.
Many U.S. judgments against foreign defendants have been
rendered unenforceable due to service of process defects estab-
lished in foreign courts at the enforcement stage. Defendants
who neglect to preserve their service challenges at the outset
can later be held to have waived these potentially-dispositive
defenses.
when the claimant's ties to the particular European forum at issue are not sub-
stantially stronger than the U.S. defendant's.
1995] 473
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The first question regarding how to perfect service of pro-
cess abroad is whether the defendant's country is one of the 30
signatories to the Hague Service Convention. 16 Each Hague
Service Convention country designates a "Central Authority,"
through which a party from abroad seeking service must trans-
mit judicial documents. The country's Central Authority itself
takes care of service. This circumvents the diplomatic breach-
of-sovereignty concern. Under the Hague Service Convention,
the defendant's countries' own officials serve process, after find-
ing out what a foreign lawsuit is all about. 17
However, while the Convention is theoretically "man-
datory" in signatory countries,' 8 there exist certain procedures
which effectively streamline the Convention and allow a few
simplified service routes entirely short-circuiting the Central
Authority.19
16 The Convention on Service of Process of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638,
658 U.N.T.S. 163 (available in foreign law volume of Martindale-Hubbell). The
U.S. and all European Union member states except Ireland are signatories. As to
foreign service of U.S. process, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). See generally HAGuE CON-
FERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERA-
TION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965 ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF
JUDICIAL AND ExTRAJuDicIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
(1992); Kenneth Reisenfeld, "Service of U.S. Process Abroad: A Practical Guide to
Service Under the Hague Service Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure," 24 INT'L LAW. 55 (1990).
17 A country's authorities can and sometimes do reject service of a foreign
complaint which violates internal public policy. In the context of Western Europe,
this is especially a concern with Switzerland, which, due to differences between
Swiss and U.S. policy, with some regularity rejects U.S. court pleadings. See, e.g.,
U.S. Department of State, "Judicial Assistance in Switzerland" (unpublished pa-
per available from Department of State at (202) 647-6445).
18 Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
19 One such shortcut is international service of process by mail. Some Hague
countries (for example Canada and Pakistan) expressly allow international mail
service, via statements in their accessions to the convention itself. Others (for ex-
ample Germany and the Czech Republic) expressly forbid it. An argument exists
that the Convention's § 10(a) authorizes mail service in the rest of the signatory
countries. Cf Note, "International Service of Process by Mail Under the Hague
Service Convention," 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 698 (1992). Other such shortcuts exist
due to various Hague signatories' pronouncements allowing service which does not
conform to the letter of the Convention. For example, although the texts of the
Convention and its accession statements do not say so, the United Kingdom allows
"any person in another Contracting State [to effect] service 'directly' [in the U..]
through a competent person other than a judicial officer or official, e.g. a solicitor."
Letter from W. Jones (U.K. Nationality and Treaty Dep't) to J.H.A. van Loon (Per-
manent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law) (Sept. 11, 1980).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss2/6
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Service of process in countries which have not ratified the
Hague Service Convention requires research into these coun-
tries' specific national laws. The usual procedure is to serve
"letters rogatory," which in this context means a formal request
for service to the proper foreign official. This procedure, which
must be followed in Switzerland, can take a lot of time and be
quite frustrating, as when foreign functionaries reject pleadings
due to technical or de minimus violations. The U.S. Depart-
ment of State is helpful in researching foreign service matters
and it publishes detailed papers on specific topics like "Judicial
Assistance in Switzerland."20
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction in international-context litigation,
like service of process, usually requires more attention than it
does in domestic lawsuits. Traditionally, under U.S. law the
legal analysis was effectively the same in both types of cases. In
order for a U.S. court to be able to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant, the defendant had to have sufficient "minimum con-
tacts" with the forum U.S. state to be consistent with the state's
"long-arm" statute and with the "due process" clause of the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. federal courts adopt the service of process
law of the state in which they sit. Therefore, in U.S. federal
court lawsuits the issue traditionally came down to assessing a
foreign defendants' contacts with the particular U.S. forum
state.21
To illustrate, if a U.S.-based plaintiff sued a French defend-
ant in either Oklahoma federal or state court, the traditional
U.S. personal jurisdiction analysis would focus on whether the
French entity had sufficient "minimum contacts" with
Oklahoma. The French defendant's contacts with all the other
U.S. states and territories would, for the most part, be irrele-
vant. Frustrations would arise when a foreign defendant had
substantial contacts with the U.S. as a whole, but these con-
20 The State Department will assist researchers over the telephone at (202)
647-3445, and will provide copies of these unpublished papers on request. On let-
ters rogatory generally, see 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1994).
21 An exception to this has always been those few federal statutes which have
national service of process provisions, and therefore apply a "national minimum
contacts" test to overseas defendants.
1995]
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tacts were sufficiently spread out so that no one state or terri-
tory had enough "minimum contacts" to assert personal
jurisdiction under the Constitution or under any applicable
"long arm" statute.
Some argued that a "U.S. national contacts" analysis
should apply against foreign parties, at least in federal court
proceedings. But the authoritative case law never went this far.
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has implied that when a de-
fendant is foreign, U.S. plaintiffs should have to prove greater
"minimum contacts" with the forum state than in a domestic
proceeding. 22
This "traditional" analysis still applies in state court cases
and in federal court diversity lawsuits. But very recently, effec-
tive since December 1, 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure have allowed that, as to "claims arising under federal law,"
personal jurisdiction exists over any foreign defendant who is
properly served, as long as "the exercise of jurisdiction is consis-
tent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."23
This essentially creates a "U.S. national contacts" test in federal
question cases extending personal jurisdiction as far as the
Constitution allows.
C. Discovery
Once a plaintiff establishes service of process and personal
jurisdiction in a U.S. court, the focus turns to discovery, the pro-
cess by which each side has to show its opponent most of the
cards in its hand. The U.S. practice of broad pre-trial discovery
including depositions, physical examinations, site inspections,
document production, and interrogatories 24 is virtually un-
known in the rest of the world. Even in common-law England,
pre-trial discovery is extremely limited and depositions are
rare. In fact, there are only a handful of court reporters based
22 Asahi Metal Ind. v. Sup. Ct. Calif., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) ("The unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should
have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm
of [U.S.] personal jurisdiction over national borders.... ."). But cf S&S Screw
Mach. Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); McCombs v. Cerco
Rentals, 622 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Service must be consistent with the qualifications
set out in FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1).
24 See FED. R. CIv. P. 27-36.
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in London, and these stenographers subsist chiefly on work for
U.S. lawyers deposing British witnesses for U.S. lawsuits.
In civil law countries, including those of Continental Eu-
rope, discovery is far more limited than in the U.S.. Rather
than take each others' depositions, in Continental Europe par-
ties submit briefs explaining their cases and attaching all of the
key documents. In Europe, judges, not lawyers, are fact-finders.
Documents are more important in trial than is oral testimony.
When a party to a U.S. lawsuit must take evidence abroad,
an initial inquiry is whether the foreign country is a signatory
to the Hague Evidence Convention. 25 More than 20 countries
(including the U.S.) have signed on to the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, but three European Union member states - Belgium,
Ireland, and Greece - have not. The Hague Evidence Conven-
tion, like the Hague Service Convention, funnels requests for
judicial assistance through a national "Central Authority"
which each signatory country has designated. 26
For obtaining discovery in non-Hague Evidence Convention
Countries, research into local law is especially important. 27 In
some countries, including Switzerland, taking a deposition is a
criminal act, because it threatens national sovereignty by forc-
ing a domestic citizen to appear and testify on penalty of a for-
eign country's perjury laws. There are stories of lawyers who,
25 Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (available in
foreign law volume of Martindale-Hubbell). For comment on this Convention, see,
e.g., Darrell Prescott & Edwin Alley, "Effective Evidence-Taking Under the Hague
Convention," 22 INT'L LAw. 939 (1988).
26 However, the Hague Evidence Convention is not mandatory, so parties can
take discovery through other routes. See Societ6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospa-
tiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987); Gary Born & Scott Hoing, Comity.
and the Lower Courts: Post-Adrospatiale Applications of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, 24 IN'L LAW. 393 (1990); Joseph Griffin & Mark Bravin, 'Beyond Adros-
patile: A Commentary on Foreign Discovery Provisions of the Restatement (Third)
and the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 25 INT'L
LAw. 331 (1991). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) (depositions in foreign coun-
tries); 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1994) (letters rogatory); 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1994) (subpoena
of person in foreign country).
27 Here again the U.S. State Department can be an invaluable research
source, via its series of relevant papers, including "Obtaining Evidence Abroad,"
"Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters," and country-specific reports such as "Judicial Assistance in Switzerland,"
and through its telephone assistance. See supra notes 19, 22.
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ignorant of this, found themselves led out of deposition confer-
ence rooms in handcuffs! 28
The reciprocal issue, getting discovery in the U.S. for Euro-
pean court proceedings, is seldom problematic. A U.S. statute
offers broad assistance. 29 Since U.S. discovery is broader than
is discovery in Europe, U.S. courts rarely find their foreign
counterparts' information requests unreasonable.
D. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Before suing a party who resides abroad, a claimant must
consider the location of the defendants' assets and craft an ap-
propriate strategy. Many foreign-based corporations have suffi-
cient assets in the U.S. to render collection abroad a non-issue.
But when investigation reveals a defendants' assets are or can
quickly be moved abroad, the plaintiffs' litigation strategy from
the outset must account for the inevitability of having to enforce
any successful U.S. judgment abroad.30 When arbitration is not
an option, often the enforcement factor will militate strongly to-
ward suing abroad, on the defendant's home turf. The benefits
of "home court advantage" and enhanced remedies available in
U.S. litigation, such as treble and punitive damages, are illu-
sory if the defendants' jurisdiction will not enforce U.S. judg-
ments which include these types of damages. 3 '
28 See supra text at part III(A). Note that because discovery is so radically
different in foreign countries, even when a party to a U.S. lawsuit is entitled to
take evidence abroad (through the Hague Evidence Convention or through letters
rogatory), the foreign authorities may well impose conditions which are, by U.S.
standards, bizarre. For example, a foreign magistrate, not a U.S. lawyer, may do
the questioning, and the magistrate may summarize testimony in a report, rather
than allow a verbatim transcript.
29 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994).
30 See generally Werner Ebke & Mary Parker, "Foreign Country Money-Judg-
ments and Arbitral Awards and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the U.S.: A Conventional Approach," 24 INT'L LAw. 21 (1990).
31 For example this is the case in Switzerland and, often, Germany. See Mar-
tin Bernet & Nicholas Ulmer, "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judg-
ments in Switzerland," 27 INT'L LAw. 317, 326-29 (1993); Hartwin Bungert,
"Enforcing U.S. Excessive and Punitive Damages Awards in Germany," 27 INT'L
LAW. 1075 (1993). For a collection of sources on the recognition and enforcement of
U.S. judgments outside the U.S., see Robert Lutz, "Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments, Part II: A Selected Bibliography on Enforcement of U.S. Judgments in For-
eign Countries," 27 Ir'L LAw. 1029 (1993). See generally INTERNATIONAL
EXECUTION AGAINST JUDGMENT DEBTORS (Dennis Campbell ed., 1994); INTERNA-
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A claimant who must enforce a judgment abroad has to win
twice, once in the U.S. court and once in collateral enforcement
litigation on the defendant's home turf. On occasion, a foreign
defendant will even devise a strategy in U.S. litigation which
relies on its winning at home at the enforcement level. In one
U.S. federal court lawsuit, a Swiss company which manufac-
tures a consumer product well-known in the U.S. found itself
sued stateside by its American distributor. The Swiss lawyers
determined that their company would not be held subject to
U.S. jurisdiction under Swiss law principles. However, under
U.S. law, a U.S. court was very likely to (and ultimately did)
exercise personal jurisdiction. Because its assets were all in
Europe, the Swiss company decided to challenge jurisdiction
and service of process in the U.S. federal court. After losing that
challenge, it planned simply to stop defending the case. The
theory was that a U.S. default judgment would be worthless if
the plaintiff could not get it enforced in Switzerland. The Swiss
lawyers were that confident that a Swiss court would indeed re-
open the jurisdiction issue (given that the company had pre-
served the point by challenging jurisdiction in the U.S. proceed-
ing)32 and would ultimately decide, under Swiss law, that no
U.S. jurisdiction had existed.
The reciprocal enforcement-of-judgment issue is the ques-
tion of how to enforce a European-rendered judgment in the
U.S. against an American defendant whose assets are stateside.
When a European court has rendered such a judgment, the ap-
plicable law governing enforcement is the law of the U.S. state
in which the defendant holds assets. 33 Many U.S. states have
adopted the "Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act."34 This model act which seeks to bring all U.S. states' laws
TIONAL RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS (Gregory Paley ed.,
1994).
32 A defendant who "objects to jurisdiction" in a proceeding outside of Switzer-
land "will not, under Swiss principles, be deemed to have submitted to foreign ju-
risdiction." Bernet & Ulmer, supra note 31, at 323.
33 For a collection of sources on the recognition and enforcement in the U.S. of
foreign country judgments, see Robert E. Lutz, "Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments, Part I: A Selected Bibliography on U.S. Enforcement of Judgments Ren-
dered Abroad," 27 INT'L LAw. 471 (1993).
34 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962), codified at, for e.g., Omo Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.90-
.94 (1994). See Alan Sorkowitz, "Enforcing Judgments Under the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act," 37 PRAc. LAw. 57 (July 1991).
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into conformity with prevailing internationally-accepted en-
forcement principles, contains exceptions rendering judgments
unenforceable when they violate a U.S. state's public policy, and
when they were obtained by fraud. Service of process is another
key issue under the Uniform Act. A U.S. defendant who was
not properly served in the foreign action can escape enforce-
ment in the U.S.35 A reciprocity provision in the Act requires
that the country from which the judgment comes similarly re-
spect U.S. judgments.
IV. FORUM SELECTION WITHIN EUROPE
When a U.S. party finds itself in a dispute with a European,
the initial forum selection issue is usually "U.S. versus Europe."
When U.S. courts win out, the question turns to which U.S.
court to select, state or federal, and in which state. When the
European forum wins out, forum analysis can turn to the issue
of which European court and country to select.
Each European Union member state3 6 has its own unique
court system, over which exists the European Community
35 See generally Ronald Brand, 'Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in
the U.S.: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance," 67 NOME DAME
L. REV. 253 (1991).
3 The European Union (which is for most practical purposes synonymous
with the older terms "European Community" and "European Common Market") is
a unique, often-amended treaty which superimposes a quasi-federalist governmen-
tal structure over the legal systems of its signatory "member states." For
overviews of the EU structure, see, e.g., LuciE A. CARSWELL & XAVIER DE SARRAO,
LAw & BusINEss IN THE EuRoPEAN SINGLE MARKEr, chaps. 1-3 (1993); DESMOND
DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
chaps. 7-10 (1994); EURoPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AFTER 1992: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON MARKET, chaps. 1, 23 (Ralph Folsom et al.
eds., 1993); and Jean Thieffry, Philip Van Doom & Simon Lowe, "The Single Euro-
pean Market: A Practitioner's Guide to 1992," 12 B.C. INT'L COMP & L. REV. 357
(1989). This author has written about other aspects of EU law in Donald C. Dow-
ling, Jr., 'Employment Matters and the Social Charter," chapter 19 in EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW AFrER 1992 (Folsom, Lake & Nanda eds., 1993); Nancy E. Honig
& Donald C. Dowling, Jr., "How to Handle Employment Issues in European Deals,"
13 PREVENTIVE L. REP. 3 (Spring 1994); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., 'EC Employment
Law After Maastricht: Continental Social Europe?," 27 INT'L LAw. 1 (1993) re-
printed as chapter 16.1 in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CommNmrrY LAw (W. Hancock ed.,
1994); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., "How Does Europe Regulate Power Within Its Corpo-
rations?," 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 601 (1992) (book review); Donald C. Dowling,
Jr., 'LEuropa Sociale: Il Punto di Vista delle Imprese Multinazionali USA," 25-26
INDUSTRIA E SINDACATO 16 (1991) (Rome); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., 'Worker Rights
in the Post-1992 EC: What 'Social Europe' Means to U.S.-Based Multinational Em-
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Court of Justice, based in Luxembourg, and the European Com-
munity Court of First Instance. 37 Certain other disputes also
get heard by the European Community Commission, an admin-
istrative body. But these three European tribunals only adjudi-
cate certain matters of European Union law. Much European
Union law gets adjudicated in the member state courts under
the "direct effect" doctrine. The vast majority of disputes be-
tween U.S. and European business never make their way before
these three European Union tribunals.
A unique treaty called the Brussels Convention 38 controls
questions of jurisdiction among the courts of the European
Union member states. If you win a lawsuit in Denmark against
a Greek defendant, it is the Brussels Convention which will al-
low you to execute your judgment in Greece. The raison d'6tre
of the European Union is to encourage the free movement of
goods, services, and capital among the member states. The idea
behind the Brussels Convention is the concomitant goal of en-
couraging the free movement of judgments.39
Technically the Brussels Convention is not a European
Union instrument; it is an entirely separate international
treaty which exists as a parallel universe to the European
Union treaties themselves. But all the European Union mem-
ber states ratified the Brussels Convention, and it is adjudi-
cated by the European Union's Court of Justice. 40
ployers," 11 Nw. J. INTrL L. & Bus. 564 (1991), reprinted as chapter 16 in Euro-
pean Economic Community Law (W. Hancock ed., 1992).
37 For a non-technical discussion of how the two European Union courts allo-
cate jurisdiction between themselves and with the member states' courts, see, e.g.,
Dinan, supra note 36, at 295-310.
38 European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1969 O.J. (C-97) 2; J.L.M. 229 (1968)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention].
39 Because the Brussels Convention effectively allows free enforcement of
judgments among member states, some U.S. litigators have considered seeking en-
forcement of a U.S. judgment in the friendliest possible EU member state, for ex-
ample England, and then invoking the Brussels Convention to enforce that
"English" judgment in a less-friendly member state where the defendant has as-
sets, say Germany, when there is a treble or punitive damage component to the
original U.S. award. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40 A proposed parallel treaty, the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Between the Member
States of the European Communities and of the European Free Trade Association,
September 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L-319)9, exists to address enforcement of judg-
ments between EU and European Free Trade Agreement [EFTA] member states.
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The Brussels Convention's Article 26 states "a judgment
given in a Contracting State shall be recognized in the other
Contracting States without any special procedure being re-
quired."41 However, even inter-European Union judgments will
not be respected if: they are contrary to public policy in the en-
forcing state; there was a service of process problem and a de-
fault judgment was entered; or the judgment is irreconcilable
with a prior judgment.42
V. CONCLUSION: PROCEDURAL DisPuTE RESOLUTION ISSUES
OFTEN HAVE CRITICAL SUBSTANTVE EFFECT
In order effectively to represent a client in an international
transaction, those who put deals together need to focus on all
the dispute resolution issues which can come into play, even
though the team structuring the deal hopes for future coopera-
tion, not dissention. The best international transactions are
structured so that disputes which pop up later resolve them-
selves. From the point of view of a transactional lawyer, this
resolution should, of course, be to the client's own advantage.
Not long ago my law firm had the good fortune to be in-
volved in such a case. Our client was a Dutch machine manu-
facturer which had sold a large piece of equipment to a
customer in Washington state. The sale documents had con-
tained a boilerplate clause saying that all disputes would be re-
solved via arbitration at the Hague, in Holland - a home court
advantage for our client. At the time of the transaction, the
Washington customer, focusing on getting the equipment and
not on fighting over it later, said nothing about this fine-print
forum selection provision. When a dispute did arise, the cus-
tomer sued in Washington federal court. We immediately
raised the boilerplate arbitration clause by motion, moving to
dismiss on arbitrability. After a hearing on just the arbi-
trability issue, the court ruled it had to uphold the clause, so it
dismissed the case. The U.S. plaintiff, no longer able to play on
Id. However, the Lugano Convention has never been implemented. Now that
most EFTA nations are being admitted into the EU, perhaps it never will be.
41 Brussels Convention, supra note 38, at art. 26.
42 Brussels Convention, supra note 38.
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its home court, gave up, without filing for a Hague arbitration!
Careful attention to dispute resolution up front, at the transac-
tion stage, ended up winning a later-arising litigated dispute.
19
